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ABSTRACT
Today, about 10% of TLS connections are still using CBC-mode
cipher suites, despite a long history of attacks and the availability
of better options (e.g. AES-GCM). In this work, we present three new
types of attack against four popular fully patched implementations
of TLS (Amazon’s s2n, GnuTLS, mbed TLS and wolfSSL) which
elected to use “pseudo constant time” countermeasures against
the Lucky 13 attack on CBC-mode. Our attacks combine several
variants of the PRIME+PROBE cache timing technique with a new
extension of the original Lucky 13 attack. They apply in a cross-VM
attack setting and are capable of recovering most of the plaintext
whilst requiring only amoderate number of TLS connections. Along
the way, we uncovered additional serious (but easy to patch) bugs
in all four of the TLS implementations that we studied; in three
cases, these bugs lead to Lucky 13 style attacks that can be mounted
remotely with no access to a shared cache. Our work shows that
adopting pseudo constant time countermeasures is not sufficient to
attain real security in TLS implementations in CBC mode.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Side-channel analysis and counter-
measures; Security protocols; Symmetric cryptography and hash
functions;
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1 INTRODUCTION
“All secure implementations are alike; each insecure implementation
is buggy in its own way.” – after Leo Tolstoy, Anna Karenina.
1.1 Background
The celebrated Lucky 13 attack on TLS [3] builds on Vaudenay’s
padding oracle attack [9, 33] and exploits small timing variations
present in implementations of TLS’s decryption processing for
CBC-mode cipher suites. The attack enables remote plaintext re-
covery of TLS-protected data that is sent repeatedly in predictable
locations in a connection, such as HTTP cookies. The exploited
timing variations were endemic in TLS implementations due to
TLS’s reliance on a MAC-then-pad-then-encrypt construction in
CBCmode: reversing these steps requires removal of padding before
robust integrity checks have been performed. An attacker could
exploit CBC-mode’s “cut and paste” property to place target cipher-
text blocks at the end of TLS records so that they were interpreted
as containing padding. The timing differences between good and
bad padding could then be translated into leakage about target
plaintext blocks. Under an assumption about the presence of mali-
cious client-side JavaScript, an attacker could arrange for arbitrary
plaintext bytes to be recovered. Similar techniques were exploited
in the POODLE attack [29] which was specific to SSL’s padding con-
struction. Implementation-specific variants of the Lucky 13 attack
were also discovered, see for example [2, 4, 5].
The TLS developer community responded in a variety of differ-
ent ways to Lucky 13.1 OpenSSL, used in Apache and NGINX, its
BoringSSL fork used by Google in Chrome and server-side, as well
as NSS used in Mozilla Firefox, added roughly 500 new lines of
code to implement the decryption processing required in a fully
constant-time, constant-memory-access fashion. The code is com-
plex and difficult to understand for developers not fully conversant
in constant-time programming techniques.2 Even this was not fully
successful at first, as a code-branch in OpenSSL taking advantage
of AES hardware support was not properly patched, and an even
worse attack was enabled [32].
Other implementations (e.g. Amazon’s s2n, GnuTLS, wolfSSL)
took an easier route by adopting “pseudo constant time” solutions
to address Lucky 13. For example, s2n attempted to equalise the
MAC verification time by adding dummy HMAC computations and
also included a random timing delay. This kind of approach was
perhaps justified given the small timing differences involved in
Lucky 13 (on the order of 1 microsecond, making the attack difficult
to mount in practice, especially remotely) and the complexity of
the OpenSSL patch. However, soon after, Irazoqui et al. [5] showed
how to re-enable the Lucky 13 attack in a cross-VM setting, by
presenting cache-based “FLUSH+RELOAD" attacks that detect the
dummy function calls that only occur when bad padding is encoun-
tered. Their attacks work on deduplication-enabled platforms (e.g.
those implementing Kernel SamePage Merging, KSM, or related
technologies). In this setting, their attacks apply to those implemen-
tations which take the simplest approach to remediation, that of
adding dummy computations via new function calls. Irazoqui et al.
showed that the PolarSSL (now mbed TLS), GnuTLS and CyaSSL
(now wolfSSL) implementations were all vulnerable to attack in
their specific deduplication-enabled, cross-VM setting. PolarSSL
patched against this attack, but GnuTLS and wolfSSL chose not
to. However, as deduplication is currently disabled across differ-
ent VMs by Infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) providers [23], no
practical cross-VM attack against any implementation is currently
known.3
1A partial list of vendor responses can be found at http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
Lucky13.html.
2See https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/02/04/luckythirteen.html for a detailed dis-
cussion of this patch.
3More recently Xiao et al. [35] used an automated differential analysis framework
to find cache-based side channels to re-enable the Lucky 13 attack against GnuTLS
and mbed TLS code that runs directly inside an Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX)
secure enclave. However, they require root permissions for their “man in the kernel”
attack.
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ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 4.4%
RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA 1.7%
RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA 1.2%
ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA 1.2%
ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA 1.1%
ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 1.1%
Table 1: Distribution of CBC-mode TLS cipher suites.
Source: ICSI Certificate Notary, 24/04/2018 [1]
More broadly, the Lucky 13 attack, and the vulnerabilities in the
alternative RC4-based cipher suites discovered around the same
time, nudged developers into finally implementing and deploying
TLS 1.2 with its support for more modern AES-GCM-based cipher
suites. These have risen in popularity to the point today where
more than 80% of TLS connections rely on AES-GCM. Yet still today,
more than 10% of TLS traffic is protected with CBC-mode cipher
suites in the original MAC-then-pad-then-encrypt construction,
see Table 1.4 Notably, CBC-mode cipher suites relying on HMAC
with SHA-384 for integrity have risen in popularity over SHA-256
and SHA-1 (this might be due to the fact that on modern 64-bit
CPUs, SHA-384 is faster per byte than SHA-256). This 10% figure
makes the security of CBC-mode cipher suites of enduring interest
and means that their continued study (and elimination in the event
of new vulnerabilities being found) is still of considerable value.
1.2 Our contributions
Our main contribution is to present novel cache timing attacks on a
representative set of implementations of TLS that did not adopt the
fully constant-time/constant-memory-access approach to address
Lucky 13, but which instead used pseudo constant time fixes. We
are thus able to mount practical attacks on TLS implementations
that have been fully patched against all previously known variants
of Lucky 13, including previous cache-based attacks such as [5].
As usual for such attacks, we assume the existence of a co-located
adversary running on the same CPU as the victim’s process or VM,
and a shared cache. However, in contrast to [5], we do not rely on
memory deduplication technologies like KSM, that are currently
disabled across different VMs by IaaS providers [23]. Instead, we
only assume a shared Last Level Cache (LLC) side-channel as in [23].
Our attacks are capable of plaintext recovery with low complex-
ity. We use 3 different LLC side-channel based attack techniques to
target the s2n, GnuTLS, mbed TLS and wolfSSL implementations,
giving for each technique a proof of concept (PoC) attack.
The attacks were developed through manual code inspection of
the different implementations. We show that each implementation
provides some leakage to the adversary about the amount of TLS
padding present in a plaintext underlying a chosen ciphertext. Using
by-now standard “JavaScript in the browser” methods (see, for
example, [3]), such leakage can be leveraged to perform plaintext
recovery for TLS cookies, for example. Naive exploitation of some
of the leakages requires a large number of TLS connections, but we
show how to fine-tune them to improve their performance by three
orders of magnitude. We also introduce a novel variant of Lucky 13
4RFC 7366 [18] specifies an alternative “Encrypt-then-MAC” construction, but figures
obtained from the ICSI Certificate Notary indicate that it is barely used.
that uses long TLS padding patterns. These enhancements should
be of independent interest.
1.2.1 Implementation Bugs in Lucky13 Countermeasures. As a
secondary contribution, we point out that all the reviewed pseudo
constant time implementations of TLS (s2n, GnuTLS, mbed TLS,
wolfSSL) have bugs in their pseudo-constant-time code that come
into play when SHA-384 is selected as the hash algorithm in HMAC.
These bugs are easy to fix by changing some constants related to
the SHA-384 hash size, but render the decryption operations non-
constant time and therefore vulnerable to relatively simple plaintext
recovery attacks. Moreover, we show that GnuTLS is still vulnerable
to a novel variant of the original Lucky 13 attack even for SHA-256,
despite having been specifically patched against Lucky 13.
1.2.2 New variants of the PRIME+PROBE attack:
(1) The synchronized probe PRIME+PROBE attack can sense the
time between an event controlled by the attacker (e.g. sending a
message to the target) and a non-constant-time memory access.
We send the message at time tsend and assume that the memory
access will occur either at time tsend+ t1 or tsend+ t2 depending
on some secret value. We synchronize the cache probing to
occur at time tsend + tprobe (where t1 < tprobe < t2). We create
a “race condition” between our probe and the target’s memory
access. From the result of the cache probing, we get a timing
oracle. This attack technique is especially useful in LLC side-
channels like those in [23], in a scenario where the side-channel
probing resolution is not high enough to time the event by
continuous probing. The delay tprobe is both code and machine
specific.
(2) The synchronized prime PRIME+PROBE attack can distinguish
between two different memory access patterns after an event
controlled by the attacker (e.g. sending a message to the target).
We send the message at time tsend and assume that the target
code will access the memory at time tsend + t1. Depending on
some secret value, the target code might access the memory
again at time tsend + t2. We synchronize the cache priming
to occur at time tsend + tprime (where t1 < tprime < t2). We
probe the cache at some time tprobe > t2. From the result of
the cache probing, we get an oracle for the secret value. Again
this attack technique is especially useful a scenario where the
side-channel probing resolution is not high enough to perform
multiple measurements in the interval of length t1 − t2. The
delay tprime is both code and machine specific.
(3) The “PostFetch” attack can help to overcome large cache lines
that reduce the cache attack resolution. We would like to dis-
tinguish between the cases of accessing just the first few bytes
of an array inside a cache line, and accessing most of the array.
However, due to the cache line size, the whole array will be
read into the cache in both cases. In some scenarios, if a large
part of a cache line is accessed (near the cache line boundary),
then the next cache line will also be read into the cache. This
can be caused by either hardware memory prefetching or by
speculative execution. In those scenarios, we can distinguish
between the two types of access by probing the cache line that
contains the bytes after the array.
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1.2.3 Implications of Our Results. We consider our complete set
of results surprising in the light of the huge amount of effort spent
on correcting and verifying CBC-mode and HMAC implementa-
tions in TLS over the last 5 years. For example, s2n was repeatedly
patched in response to Lucky 13 style attacks [2, 4]. Its principal au-
thor, Colm MacCarthaigh wrote a detailed and thoughtful blogpost
explaining AWS’s selected approach to defending against this kind
of attack [24], focussing on the argument that a balance needs to be
struck between code simplicity and security. Moreover, the vulner-
able s2n HMAC code had also passed formal verification [10, 13].
At its core, our work shows that nothing short of the full “belt
and braces" approach adopted in OpenSSL is sufficient to provide a
robust defence against Lucky 13 style attacks in all their forms, and
in fact the approach taken in OpenSSL is immune to our attacks.
While our cache-based timing attacks are different from the meth-
ods used in previous attacks against s2n [2, 4] and mbed TLS [5],
cache-based attack scenarios have been well-known and broadly ac-
cepted as being realistic in the security community for some years.
In retrospect, the developers of the TLS implementations which we
target in this work might have better invested their code develop-
ment effort in adopting fully robust approaches from the beginning,
rather than being forced to incrementally patch against each new
generation of attack (or to have to expend energy defending the
decision not to patch at all).
1.3 Disclosure
We have disclosed the vulnerabilities to all vendors mentioned in
the paper, and suggested a coordinated public disclosure on the
25th of July 2018. The status of these disclosures at the time of
writing is as follows:
• The wolfSSL team followed our recommendation and switched
to the full constant time solution in release 3.15.35 (released 20th
June 2018).
• The mbed TLS team released a security advisory6 on July 25th
2018. CVEs 2018-0497 and 2018-0497 were assigned to the SHA-
384 bug and to the cache-based timing attacks, respectively. Both
CVEs were rated “high severity” and users were advised to up-
grade to new releases of the code, or to disable the CBC-mode
cipher suite if this is not possibles. Our understanding is that the
new releases provide interim fixies, with a full solution to follow
in due course.
• The GnuTLS team made a number of changes to their code on
June 12th 2018 and then in releases 3.6.3, 3.5.19 and 3.3.30 on July
16th 2018. These changes address the bugs in SHA-384 constants
and adopt a new variant of the pseudo constant time approach,
roughly equalising the running time of decryption processing
by ensuring a constant number of hash compression function
calls is made. However, we believe that the GnuTLS code is
still vulnerable to variants of the attacks presented in our paper
due to its padding-dependent memory accesses. We notified the
GnuTLS team of our concerns about this on June 13th 2018. Our
understanding is that the GnuTLS team does not plan to address
the issues, but prefers to promote the use of Encrypt-then-MAC
5https://www.wolfssl.com/docs/wolfssl-changelog/.
6https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/
mbedtls-security-advisory-2018-02.
(as specified in RFC 7366) when legacy cipher suites are required.
Red Hat assigned CVEs 2018-10844, 2018-10845 and 2018-10846
to the issues.
• Amazon’s s2n team plans to remove CBC-mode cipher suites
from their list of preferred ciphers, and will replace their imple-
mentation of CBC-mode decryption with the fully constant time
one from BoringSSL.
1.4 Paper Structure
Section 2 gives further background on the Lucky 13 attack and
cache attacks, and Section 3 describes the bugs we found in the
various implementations of the lucky 13 countermeasures. Next we
describe the main contribution of our paper: Section 4 describes our
synchronized probe PRIME+PROBE attack on Amazon’s s2n imple-
mentation and Section 5 provides details on how to optimize the
full byte plaintext recovery. Section 6 describes our synchronized
prime PRIME+PROBE attack on mbed TLS, GnuTLS and wolfSSL.
In Section 7 we introduce our novel “PostFetch” attack on the mbed
TLS implementation. Finally, Section 8 discusses the results and
raises some open questions.
2 FURTHER BACKGROUND
2.1 TLS Record Processing and the Lucky 13
Attack
For a detailed account of how TLS is processing records in CBC-
mode cipher suites and how this enables the Lucky 13 attack, see [2,
3]. We present here a highly compressed version of this information
heavily based on [2] in order to make the paper self-contained.
A TLS record R (viewed as a byte sequence) is processed as
follows. The sender has an 8-byte per-record sequence number
SQN, and forms a 5-byte field HDR consisting of a 2-byte version
field, a 1-byte type field, and a 2-byte length field. The sender
then calculates a MAC over the bytes SQN| |HDR| |R; let T denote the
resulting MAC tag. The size t of the MAC tag depends on the hash
function specified for use in HMAC in the cipher suite.
The record is encoded by setting P = R | |T | |pad. Here pad is a
sequence of padding bytes chosen such that the length of P in bytes
is a multiple of the block-size b of the selected block cipher (b = 16
for AES). In TLS, the padding must consist of p + 1 copies of some
byte value p, where 0 ≤ p ≤ 255. Implementations typically use the
last byte of pad as an indicator of the padding length to determine
how many padding bytes should be present in a record and what
values those bytes should take.
In the encryption step, the encoded record P is encrypted using
CBC-mode of the selected block cipher. TLS 1.1 and 1.2 mandate
an explicit IV, which should be randomly generated. TLS 1.0 (and
SSL) use a chained IV. Thus, the ciphertext blocks are computed as:
Cj = EKe (Pj ⊕ Cj−1)
where Pi are the blocks of P , C0 is the IV, and Ke is the key for the
block cipher E. The final ciphertext data has the form:
HDR| |C
where C is the concatenation of the blocks Ci (including or exclud-
ing the IV depending on the particular SSL or TLS version). Note
that the sequence number is not transmitted as part of the message.
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At a high level, the decryption process reverses this sequence
of steps: first the ciphertext is decrypted block by block to recover
the plaintext blocks:
Pj = DKe (Cj ) ⊕ Cj−1,
where D denotes the decryption algorithm of the block cipher.
Then the padding is checked and removed, and finally, the MAC
is checked. However, these operations must be performed without
leaking any information about what the make-up of the plaintext
blocks is in terms of message, MAC field and padding, and whether
the format is valid. Prior literature including [2–5, 9] illustrates the
difficulties of doing this securely.
As a flavour of what can go wrong, consider an attacker that
wishes to decrypt a target ciphertext block C∗; let C∗−1 denote the
preceding block in the sequence of ciphertext blocks. The attacker
intercepts a ciphertext HDR| |C and injects HDR′ | |C | |C∗−1 ⊕ ∆| |C∗ so
that it is received in the sequence of TLS records. Here HDR′ is
a modified header containing the correct length field and ∆ is a
block-size mask. A naive implementation might treat the last block
of this ciphertext as containing padding, check its validity, and then
either send a padding error message or extract and verify the MAC.
By construction, the last block is equal to P∗ ⊕ ∆, where P∗ is the
(unknown) target plaintext block. Whether or not the padding is
valid therefore leaks information about P∗ ⊕ ∆, and thence about
P∗. By varying the value of ∆ across different injected TLS records,
the attacker can gradually build up information about P∗, possibly
recovering it in its entirety.
In reality, attacks against CBC-mode in TLS are more complex
than this:
• First, all errors are fatal, meaning that the connection is termi-
nated and the key is thrown away. However, an attacker can aim
to recover plaintext blocks that are repeated in predictable loca-
tions over many connections, e.g. HTTP cookies, with client-side
malicious JavaScript being used to initiate the required connec-
tions and the cookies being automatically injected into connec-
tions by the victim’s web browser.
• Second, the error messages are encrypted, so the attacker cannot
directly learn whether or not the padding is valid. Instead, the
leakage typically comes from timing information. For example,
in the above discussion, we assumed that the MAC was only
checked if the padding is good; of course the MAC verification
will fail with overwhelming probability, and the error condition
will then leak through the timing of the error message, which
can be measured by an attacker located on the network.
• Third, such large timing differences are no longer present in
implementations, due to patching. In particular, in view of the
attacks of [9, 33], the TLS 1.1 and 1.2 specifications recommend
checking the MAC even if the padding is bad, and doing so on a
synthetic message whose length is equal to that of the plaintext
(i.e. as if the padding had zero length). This reduces, but does
not completely eliminate the timing differences; the remaining
timing variation was exploited in Lucky 13 [3].
• Fourth, as the timing differences have become smaller through
patching, so network noise has made mounting the attacks re-
motely progressively harder. This in part motivates cache-based
attacks with a co-located attacker, like those in [5] and here.
2.2 Cache attacks
Cache attacks have become one of the most prolific types of attack
against cryptographic primitives, using different techniques for
measuring leakage of secret values (e.g. [16, 23, 30, 38]). Those
different techniques were used to break real world cryptographic
implementations (e.g. [6, 8, 15, 17, 19, 37, 39]). The assumption that
the attacker can run code on the same platform as the target’s
process is now widely accepted and used, including in the recent
Meltdown [22] and Spectre [20] attacks.
Some cache attacks (e.g. [38] required shared memory between
the attacker and target processes. Memorymight be shared between
different processes or even VMs due to memory deduplication.
Memory deduplication optimizations (e.g. KSM), allow two or more
processes or VMs to share identical memory pages (e.g. shared
library code or constants). However, due to the discovered security
implications, today they are disabled between different VMs by IaaS
providers [23]. Usingmore advanced techniques such as those in [16,
21, 23] cross-VM attacks are now practical even when memory
deduplication is disabled.
Our cache attack techniques are based on the PRIME+PROBE [30]
attack variant of Liu et al. [23] that allows cross-VM attacks. The
Mastik [36] toolkit contains an implementation of this attack. We
will give a short description of the general PRIME+PROBE attack
(for a detailed account of the techniques see [23]). The main idea
is that the access time to data that is stored in the cache is much
smaller than for data that is stored in main memory. In the first
PRIME phase of the attack, the attacker fills the part of the cache
that will hold the target’s data by accessing its own data in specific
memory locations. In the second PROBE phase, the attacker tests if
part of its data was evicted from the cache by measuring the access
time to its own data. If all of the data is still in the cache, the tar-
get’s data was not accessed. Otherwise, either the target’s data was
accessed, or some other code forced the eviction of the attacker’s
data. If the target’s code access pattern to its data is determined by
some secret value, the attacker can learn this value.
3 IMPLEMENTATION BUGS IN LUCKY13
COUNTERMEASURES
Pseudo constant time countermeasures are very hard to get right
and maintain over time. This is due both to the possibility of finding
novel variants of the original attacks, and the need to manually
check the timing implications of adding new features. In contrast,
real constant time implementations are more robust against novel
attack variants, and bugs created by supporting new features will
likely be found by unit-testing. TLS 1.2 [12] added new ciphers
suites based on CBC-mode for encryption and HMAC-SHA-384 for
integrity. The SHA-384 hash function is considered more secure,
and also has better performance on 64-bit processors, than the pre-
viously supported SHA-1 and SHA-256 algorithms. We tested if
TLS implementations supporting HMAC-SHA-384 are vulnerable
to timing attacks similar to the one described in [2]. All of the
constant-time implementations that we checked (OpenSSL, Bor-
ingSSL, NSS) were secure. However, all of the "pseudo" constant
time implementations (i.e. those only ensuring a constant number
of compression function calls) had bugs making them vulnerable
to attack. The reason for the bugs is that, although the SHA-384
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cipher suites were added, the code responsible for adding dummy
compression function calls was not updated correctly. Specifically,
SHA-384 has a 128-byte block size (compared to the 64-byte blocks
of SHA-256), and encodes the message length using 16 bytes (com-
pared to 8 bytes in SHA-256). All of the extra compression function
call calculations have hard-coded values appropriate for SHA-256
but not SHA-384, resulting in them using a non-constant number
of calls to the SHA-384 compression function. We explain in more
detail below for each of the four "pseudo" constant time implemen-
tations we studied; since the bugs are easily fixed, we do not go into
great detail on how each bug leads to a plaintext recovery attack.
3.1 GnuTLS Implementation
Although the function dummy_wait (see Listing 3 in Appendix A)
uses the correct hash block size, it also uses the hard-coded number
"9". This comes from at least 1 byte for the the hash function padding
and the 8 bytes used to encode the hashed message length for SHA-
256. However, in SHA-384, the message length is encoded using
16 bytes, and so the correct value should be "17" rather than "9".
The code includes a comment warning that this is a hash-specific
fix, but it was apparently not corrected when the SHA-384 cipher
suites were added.
Even more surprisingly, we discovered that the GnuTLS Imple-
mentation is vulnerable to a timing attack when SHA-256 is selected
as the hash algorithm in HMAC, despite this having been patched
in response to Lucky 13 [27]. The function dummy_wait can add
at most one call to the hash compression function. However, the
attack described in Section 6.3 creates a padding oracle that distin-
guishes between a valid pad of a large length (PadLen > 240) and
an invalid padding (PadLen = 0). In that case, for GnuTLS, there
will be a timing difference of 3 calls to the compression function
of SHA-256, that is 3 times larger than the timing difference in the
original Lucky 13 attack [3].
3.2 mbed TLS Implementation
The function ssl_decrypt_buf (see Listing 8 in Appendix A) uses
the hard-coded value "64" (for block size) and "8" (for message length
encoding). These should be "128" and "16", respectively, for SHA-
384. For example, HMAC verification of a decrypted TLS record of
length 512 and valid padding of length in the range PadLen = 229
will result in 3 more compression functions call than same length
TLS record with invalid padding (PadLen = 0). Again we can use
the attack described in Section 6.3 to create a padding oracle to
distinguish between the two cases, resulting in a timing difference
much larger than the one in the original Lucky 13 attack [3].
3.3 WolfSSL Implementation
The function GetRounds (see Listing 5 in Appendix A) uses the
hard-coded numbers "64" and "55" (64-8-1). These should be "128"
and "111", respectively, for SHA-384. The same attack described in
Section 3.2can also be used against the WolfSSL implementation.
3.4 Amazon’s s2n Implementation
The s2n_hmac_digest_two_compression_rounds function (see
Listing 1) can add one dummy compression function call. The calcu-
lation of the condition uses the hard-coded number 9 as the minimal
number of bytes to add, whereas 17 would be appropriate for SHA-
384. This bug was not detected during the formal verification of the
HMAC code carried out by Galois [13]. However, unlike our new
cache attack for s2n presented in Section 4, the attack arising from
this bug (modeled on that in [2]) is likely to be impractical due to
the random delay protection in s2n.
4 A CACHE-BASED PADDING ORACLE IN
AMAZON’S S2N IMPLEMENTATION
Amazon’s s2n TLS implementation is responsible for protecting all
of the traffic to Amazon’s S3 cloud storage service [31]. This imple-
mentation was previously analysed by Albrecht and Paterson [2]
and found vulnerable to a variant of the Lucky 13 attack. The cur-
rent protection includes a pseudo constant time implementation,
and the inclusion of a very high resolution and large random delay
after detecting any error in TLS decryption. This causes previous
timing attacks to become impractical. Moreover, the correctness of
s2n’s patched HMAC implementation was formally verified [13].
However, as we will see, the memory access pattern in s2n de-
pends on the padding length byte (i.e. the last byte of the decrypted
TLS record). We will use a PRIME+PROBE [30] cache attack to build
a new padding oracle for s2n. We assume a cache side-channel as
in Liu et al. [23], and describe two versions of our attack on s2n: In
a simplified version, we target the specific code written to block
the attack in [2]. However, this attack is not practical due to an ad
hoc programming decision in s2n. In our full synchronized probe
PRIME+PROBE attack, we exploit the same programming decision,
but using the probability of cache hits and misses as an indicator of
padding length. Our full attack works on HMAC using both SHA-
384 and SHA-256, even if the simple bug described in Section 3.4 is
fixed.
4.1 Attack Preliminaries
In both attacks the cache side-channel arises from the access pattern
to a dynamically allocated memory location, more specifically a
buffer used to store part of the key in the HMAC calculation. We
first have to find the mapping of this location to the right cache
set, by exploiting a design decision of the s2n developers: All the
structures and memory buffers required for a specific connection
in s2n are allocated in the handshake phase and are reused for
all messages. We can then find the right cache set in the same
manner as in [23]. For each handshake, we trace the cache set while
processing valid messages, and find the cache set exhibiting the
activity pattern we expect for the HMAC code.
4.2 Simplified Attack
The attack described in [2] is based on the following fact: If we split
a message into two parts, and hash each of them separately, the
number of calls to the internal hash compression function might
vary depending on the split point. This is due to the padding and
length bytes added internally by the hash function. A new func-
tion s2n_hmac_digest_two_compression_rounds (see Listing 1
in Appendix A) was added to the HMAC API in s2n to block this
attack vector. This function makes two calls to the internal hash
compression function, even if the hash padding doesn’t necessitate
it. The function checks if the hash padding will require another
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Algorithm 1 s2n Simplified Attack
1: function SimplifiedS2NPadOracle(valid_msд,attack_msд)
2: xor_pad ← FindXorPadCache(valid_msg)
3: Prime(xor_pad) ▷ evict xor_pad set from cache
4: Send attacker’s TLS record to target
5: Wait for verification error
6: if Probe(xor_pad) then
7: return 1 ▷ buffer was accessed
8: else
9: return 0 ▷ buffer was not accessed
10: end if
11: end function
compression call. If not, it will reset the hash context and call an-
other update function. In that case, the buffer that is sent to the
update function is the HMAC state buffer called xor_pad. The only
other place this buffer is used is in the HMAC initialization function,
and that is called only once, in the TLS handshake.
Our attack (see Algorithm 1) is now straightforward. The attack
code runs on a different VM on the same CPU socket. We start by
finding the cache set of the xor_pad buffer. This is done by sending
valid TLS records to the target (for example, by using malicious
JavaScript running in a remote victim’s browser), and using the
PRIME+PROBE technique of [23] to find the correct cache set. We
then prime the xor_pad buffer, and send the attacker-constructed
TLS record for decryption. After the TLS record is rejected (due to
a MAC failure) we probe the cache set. If we get a cache miss, we
assume that with high probability the xor_pad buffer was accessed,
and so the TLS record’s padding length (as determined by s2n from
PadLen, the value of the last byte of the decrypted TLS record
P = R | |T | |pad) is such that the length of R mod hash_block_size
is between hash_block_size − 9 − 13 and hash_block_size −
13 (here, 13 comes from the TLS header length and "9" would be
replaced by "17" for SHA-384 if the bug identified in Section 3.4
were to be fixed). By setting the attacker’s TLS record so that its
last blocks areC∗−1 ⊕ ∆| |C∗, as in Section 2.1, information about the
value of the last byte of P∗ ⊕ ∆ is thereby leaked to the attacker.
4.3 Full synchronized probe PRIME+PROBE
Attack
The simplified attack is not practical due to the following ad hoc
programming decision in the verification function s2n_verify_cbc
(see Listing 2 in Appendix A). After finishing the HMAC calculation,
the s2n code hashes the rest of the TLS record padding bytes, to
ensure a constant number of compression function calls. In this
specific solution it is required to “remember” the number of bytes di-
gested up to this point. To allow this, the function s2n_hmac_copy
was added to the HMAC API. This function (used only in CBC-
mode processing) copies all of the state buffers of the HMAC cal-
culation, so that the copy can be used to digest the remaining
padding bytes. The copy function also copies the xor_pad buffer
(although it is not required for the calculation), and so it acciden-
tally causes it to be read into the cache. For the simplified attack
to work, we would need to arrange for the probing of the xor_pad
buffer to happen exactly in-between the call to s2n_hmac_copy
and s2n_hmac_digest_two_compression_rounds. This requires
too fine a control over timing.
Algorithm 2 s2n synchronized probe PRIME+PROBE Attack
1: function S2NPadOracle(valid_msд,attack_msд)
2: copy_xor_pad ← FindCopyXorPadCache(valid_msg)
3: Prime(copy_xor_pad) ▷ evict copy_xor_pad set from cache
4: Send attacker’s TLS record to target
5: Delay to synchronize the probe
6: if Probe(copy_xor_pad) then
7: return 1 ▷ buffer was accessed
8: else
9: return 0 ▷ buffer was not accessed
10: end if
11: end function
However, we can use the fact that the HMAC copy buffer is only
accessed in the s2n_hmac_copy function, just after finishing the
HMAC calculation over the message. The time elapsed until this
buffer is accessed is actually the same as the time taken for HMAC
verification in the Lucky 13 attack.
The full synchronized probe PRIME+PROBE attack (see Algo-
rithm 2) tries to approximate the HMAC execution time by using
a “race condition” between the message verification and the cache
probing. We start again by finding the correct cache set for the
copy_xor_pad , using valid messages. Then we prime the cache set,
and send the TLS record for decryption. We use a short delay to
synchronize the attack, as our probing step should run at approxi-
mately the same time as the HMAC verification code would finish
hashing a short message (corresponding to a long TLS padding
pattern).
We assume that there will be small timing variations due to the
behaviour of the operating system. So we run the attack multiple
times, and use the probability of a cache miss as an indicator of
the HMAC execution time. If the probability of a cache miss is
high (so Algorithm 2 outputs "0" frequently), it indicates that we
have probed before the call to s2n_hmac_copy. This means that the
HMAC execution took longer, and so we can infer that PadLen was
small. On the other hand, if the probability of a cache hit is high, it
indicates that PadLen was large. We will shortly make this analysis
more precise.
4.4 s2n’s Timing Blinding Mitigation
Amazon added a general mitigation to protect s2n from attacks
targeting their non-constant time implementation. In the event of a
decryption error, the function s2n_connection_kill adds a very
large random time delay before killing the connection and sending
the error message. This is supposed to add a large amount of noise
to any timing-based attack, making it impractical [24]. While this
random delay can indeed block regular timing attacks, it offers no
protection against our cache-based attack, as the cache access that
we target is made before the random delay is added. Moreover, since
a server running s2n can support many concurrent connections, the
random delay does not significantly slow down the rate at which
we can send attack TLS records.
4.5 s2n Proof of Concept
We experimentally implemented a PoC for the attack. We ran our
attack on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-7500U CPU @ 2.70GHz running
Ubuntu 17.10. We used the code from the master branch of the
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Hash Message PadLen Cache hit
function Length range probability
SHA-384 720 0 − 44 ≈ 0.68
SHA-384 720 45 − 172 ≈ 0.75
SHA-384 720 173 − 255 ≈ 0.97
SHA-256 576 0 − 44 ≈ 0.63
SHA-256 576 45 − 108 ≈ 0.65
SHA-256 576 109 − 172 ≈ 0.66
SHA-256 576 173 − 236 ≈ 0.90
SHA-256 576 237 − 255 ≈ 0.95
Table 2: Cache hit probabilities for s2n attack
official s2n git repository on 14/2/2018 (commit hash f742802), and
compiled with the provided make files and GCC version 7.2.0. We
targeted the code of the s2n_verify_cbc function (including the
code for hashing the header and sequence number called before the
function). The function is called to verify multiple messages that
differ only in the last byte of the decrypted TLS record (which is
used to set PadLen). Another thread was run in parallel to evaluate
the cache hit/miss probability.
We studied HMAC verification for both SHA-384 and SHA-256.
We chose a random 720-byte string (576 bytes for SHA-256) as our
decrypted TLS record (the record length must be a multiple of the
cipher block-size, and these sizes are optimal for our attack), and
ran 2000 trials of the attack for all 256 possible padding length
values in the last byte. As expected the hit probability changes on
the 128-byte boundaries of the hashed data (64-byte boundaries
for SHA-256). Since the number of bytes hashed until the call to
s2n_hmac_copy is made is:
HashLen = InnerHashKeyLen + SeqNumLen + HdrLen
+ DecMsgLen −MacLen − PadLen − 1, then
HashLenSHA-384 = 128 + 8 + 5 + 720 − 48 − PadLen − 1
= 812 − PadLen, and
HashLenSHA-256 = 64 + 8 + 5 + 576 − 32 − PadLen − 1
= 620 − PadLen
Due to the inclusion of the underlying hash length field and
padding in this hashing operation, we expect to see an increase in
the cache hit probability when PadLen ≡ 45 mod 128 (45 mod 64
for SHA-256). The experimental results in Table 2 show these ex-
pected changes. We synchronized the attack so that the cache probe
is expected to happen after ≈ 5 calls to the SHA-384 compression
function (≈ 7 for SHA-256). So we should get a cache hit with high
probability if the value of PadLen is greater than 172, and with low
probability otherwise. This can be seen in the table. There is also a
smaller change in the probability at value 44 (48, 108 and 236 for
SHA-256). When the pad length is less than 44, there is one less
compression function call, which causes the probability of a cache
hit to be even lower.
4.6 Creating the Padding Oracle
Our experiments show that s2n permits a single-bit oracle that
can distinguish if PadLen > 172 or not. Recall that PadLen is set
from the last byte of the decrypted TLS record P = R | |T | |pad,
and the method described in Section 2.1 can use such an oracle to
learn information about the value of the last byte of P∗ ⊕ ∆ for
attacker-controlled values ∆. We build this oracle by repeatedly
running Algorithm 2 and estimating the cache hit probability p.
We then use this estimate to decide whether PadLen > 172 or not.
The accuracy of this process is determined by the difference in
probabilities and the number of iterations n of Algorithm 2 that
we perform; we are effectively trying to distinguish between two
binomial distributions, one with p = 0.75 (p = 0.66 for SHA-256)
and the other with p = 0.97 (p = 0.90 for SHA-256). We set a
threshold probability of pt = 0.86 (pt = 0.78 for SHA-256) and set a
desired error probability of β . We can then calculate n, the required
number of iterations, such that Pr(Bin(n, 0.75) > 0.86n) < β and
Pr(Bin(n, 0.97) < 0.86n) < β . We can calculate the required n for
any chosen β by using the CDF of the binomial distribution.
In fact, we can generate different oracles by changing the length
of the TLS records that we send to our target. The body of the
records must have lengths that are multiples of the block-size. This
allows us to obtain oracles of the form PadLen > 12+ 16k mod 256
for any k . In Section 5 we will show how to choose n, β and the
optimal k to use in the oracle for achieving full plaintext recovery.
5 FROM S2N PADDING ORACLE TO FULL
PLAINTEXT RECOVERY
The attack in Section 4 on s2n provides us with one-bit linear
condition oracles on the padding length byte that is located at the
end of the decrypted TLS record.7
However, our goal is to recover multiple, full bytes of plaintext.
Fortunately, we can select the last blocks of the attacker’s TLS record
as C∗−1 ⊕ ∆| |C∗ for different values of mask ∆, and post-process
the results to gain information about the values of plaintext block
P∗; more precisely, since the linear conditions are always on the
very last byte p∗ of P∗, we need only vary ∆ in its last byte position
δ , and we can only gain information about p∗. In this section, we
describe two strategies for selecting the different single-byte masks
δ to try: a naive approach, and a more sophisticated one.
We remark here that going from single-byte recovery to many-
byte recovery can be achieved in the main application scenario of
recovering HTTP cookies. The idea is to use progressively longer
padding of pathnames in HTTP requests to move the target HTTP
cookie bytes one-by-one into the last position p∗ in the target block
P∗. The HTTP requests are produced by malicious JavaScript run-
ning in the victim’s browser; the browser automatically generates
the required TLS connections in response to the requests. This
is a known technique that we borrow from the literature on TLS
attacks [3, 14, 29], and we do not comment on it further here.
5.1 Naive Algorithm
The naive algorithm is described in Algorithm 3. The algorithm
receives the following parameters:
(1) OracleFunc(δ ): a function that implements a padding oracle
attack for mask value δ . This function carries out one of the
padding oracle attacks from the previous sections, targeting
a particular fixed byte p∗ in the last position in some target
plaintext block P∗. This involves repeatedly intercepting TLS
7We actually have several different conditions and oracles, depending on the attacker-
controlled TLS record length.
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Algorithm 3 Padding Oracle to Plaintext Byte — Naive Algorithm
1: function NaiveOracleToByte(OracleFunc,
OracleCondition)
2: ValList← [0..255] ▷ all possible values for PadLen
3: MaskList← [0..255] ▷ all possible one-byte mask values δ
4: for all δ in MaskList do
5: OracleRes← OracleFunc(δ )
6: for all val in ValList do
7: ValRes← OracleCondition(val ⊕ δ )
8: if ValRes , OracleRes then
9: remove val from ValList
10: end if
11: end for
12: if Length(ValList)==1 then
13: return ValList[0]
14: end if
15: end for
16: end function
records containing the target byte/block p∗/P∗ in ciphertext
block C∗, building fixed-length TLS records ending with C∗−1 ⊕
∆| |C∗ where the last byte of ∆ is set to δ , and recovering the
result of evaluating the oracle’s one-bit linear condition on
input p∗ ⊕ δ . We assume that the oracle has error probability β
when n iterations are carried out.
(2) OracleCondition(PadLen): returns the result of the linear con-
dition executed by the above oracle, assuming that the value
PadLen is used as input (along with some fixed TLS record
length). For example, the oracle may return the value of the
predicate “PadLen > 172”.
The algorithm starts by initializing two byte-lists ValList andMaskList
with all possible byte values. We iterate over all possible single-byte
mask values δ . For each possible δ , we get the result of the oracle
by running OracleFunc(δ ). We then iterate over the possible values
in ValList. For each possible val, we check if the linear condition
on val ⊕ δ is equal to the result of the oracle. If not, the value
is discarded (and this will be a correct decision with probability
1 − β). The algorithm ends when there is only one possible value
remaining in ValList.
The complexity of the algorithm is dominated by the number
of calls to the OracleFunc(·) function. The expected number is 128,
with a worst case of 256. Recall, however, that each call to this oracle
involves some number n executions of the underlying cache timing
attack, giving an average of 128n executions of the cache timing
attack. Moreover, each execution of the underlying attack consumes
a TLS connection (since the attacker’s constructed ciphertext will
always fail HMAC verification). For example, as we will see in
Section 5.3, this results in roughly 13000 runs of the synchronized
probe PRIME+PROBE attack in Algorithm 2 for the attack on s2n.
This figure of 128n might make the attack impractical. For this
reason, we developed an improved greedy algorithm which can
reduce the attack complexity by a factor of more than 50. We present
this next.
5.2 Greedy Algorithm
Our greedy algorithm optimizes the way in which we choose the
masks δ that we use in our oracle calls. Instead of iterating over all
Algorithm 4 Padding Oracle to Plaintext Byte —Greedy Algorithm
1: function GetBestMask(MaskList, ValList, OracleCondition)
2: HalfLenValList← Length(ValList)/2
3: MinMaskCount← 256 ▷ maximum possible value
4: BestMask← 0
5: for all δ in MaskList do
6: OneCount← 0
7: for all val in ValList do
8: ValRes← OracleCondition(val ⊕ δ )
9: if ValRes == 1 then
10: OneCount← OneCount + 1
11: end if
12: end for
13: Count = |HalfLenValList − OneCount| ▷ how far are
we from half the values returning 1 and half returning 0?
14: if Count ≤ MinMaskCount then
15: BestMask← δ
16: MinMaskCount← Count
17: end if
18: end for
19: end function
possible values, in each iteration of the attack we choose as the next
mask the one that will give us the most information (maximizing
the entropy of each oracle call). Algorithm 4 chooses the "best"
mask in a greedy manner. It takes as input a list of all remaining
possible byte values (ValList) and mask values (MaskList). For each
mask it simulates all the oracle responses on the possible values
remaining, and chooses the mask that maximizes the entropy of
this experiment. Since we only consider single bytes at a time, the
algorithm is efficient. In a further optimization, we can also remove
the masks with zero entropy from MaskList in each iteration.
5.3 Application to Amazon s2n
In our attack we can obtain oracles of the form “PadLen > 12 +
16k mod 256” for any k . We will analyze the run time complexity
of the SHA-384 version of the attack.
5.3.1 Attack complexity of the naive algorithm. For the naive
algorithm, the expected number of runs is 128, with a worst case of
256. We focus for the moment on successfully recovering a single
byte of plaintext with probability pB > 0.5 (a standard requirement
for success probability in cryptanalysis). In the worst case we will
require 256 correct calls to the oracle. So we would need each oracle
call to return the correct result with β = 0.51/256 = 0.9973. Based
on our experiments, we model the s2n SHA-384 attack cache hit
distribution as a binomial distribution with p = 0.75 for PadLen ≤
172 and p = 0.97 for PadLen > 172. We would then need n =
100 executions of the cache attack to distinguish between the two
distributions with probability larger than β = 0.9973. The expected
total number of cache attack executions needed for the naive attack
is then 12800 with a worst case of 25600.
5.3.2 Attack complexity of the greedy algorithm. We simulated
the complexity of the greedy algorithm for all oracles of the form
PadLen > 12+16k mod 256. The oracle with the lowest complexity
is the one with k = 10, where the condition is PadLen > 172,
having an expected number of 8.5 runs and a worst case of 11.
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This is very close to the information theoretical lower bound of 8
runs.. To achieve pB > 0.5 this requires β = 0.51/11 = 0.939, which
translates to n = 28. So the expected total number of cache attack
executions needed for the greedy attack is only 238, with a worst
case of 308. This is more than 50 times less than needed in the naive
attack.
5.3.3 Recovering multiple bytes. We are typically interested in
recovering multiple plaintext bytes, e.g. an entire 16-byte cookie,
with good probability. To achieve success probability greater than
0.5 across 16 bytes, we need a per-byte probability of pB ≈ 0.96,
which in the greedy attack yields β = 0.51/11·16 = 0.996. In turn,
this translates to n = 92 and an expected total number of TLS
connections of 782 per byte. For comparison, the naive algorithm
requires an expected total of 21900 TLS connections per byte.
6 A PADDING ORACLE BASED ON TLS
RECORD CACHE ACCESS PATTERN
The original Lucky 13 attack [3] exploited the time difference of the
TLS record verification process for valid and invalid padding. As a
mitigation, all the pseudo constant time TLS implementations added
dummy compression function calls that cause the total number of
compression function calls to be independent of the padding length.
However, unlike proper constant time TLS implementations, the
cache access pattern to the data structure holding the TLS record is
still dependent on the padding length. We can exploit this cache
access pattern with our novel synchronized prime PRIME+PROBE
attack to restore the original padding oracle of [3] in several TLS
implementations – mbed TLS , GnuTLS and wolfSSL . All imple-
mentations were patched against Lucky 13 [3]. Moreover, mbed TLS
was also patched against a second cache-based attack by Irazoqui
et al. [5], targeting the code of the first patch. We will again use a
PRIME+PROBE [30] cache attack, assuming a cache side channel as
in Liu et.al. [23]. Our attack works on HMAC using both SHA-384
and SHA-256, even if all the bugs in Section 3were fixed, and all
the previous variants of Lucky 13 were patched correctly.
6.1 Attack Preliminaries
All of the vulnerable implementations follow this general code flow
for constant time decryption:
(1) Decrypt the message, accessing all the bytes in the TLS record.
(2) Perform constant time checking of the TLS record padding,
assuming zero-length padding if the padding is not valid. All
of the final 256 bytes of the TLS record are accessed.
(3) Calculate HMAC on the decrypted TLS record payload (exclud-
ing the padding). All bytes in the decrypted TLS record are
accessed, except for the padding bytes at the end.
(4) Add extra dummy compression function calls to make the num-
ber of calls the same in every case. The data input to these
function calls is obtained from the start of the TLS record or
from a dummy memory buffer. The padding bytes of the TLS
record are not accessed (except for messages that are shorter
than the hash block size).
In our attack, we will try to distinguish between two cases: long
valid padding and long invalid padding. We will explain in Sec-
tion 6.3 how an oracle yielding this information can be used to
Algorithm 5Message Access Attack
1: functionMessageAccessPadOracle(Valid TLS records, At-
tack TLS record)
2: LastBytesCache← FindPtrCache(Valid TLS record[End])
3: Send attacker’s TLS record to target
4: Delay to synchronize to the start of the HMAC verification
5: Prime(MsgCache) ▷ evict end of record from cache
6: Delay till maximum time for HMAC calculation
7: if Probe(MsgCache) then ▷ end of record was accessed
8: return 0 ▷ padding was invalid
9: else
10: return 1 ▷ padding was valid
11: end if
12: end function
recover plaintext bytes. Consider the cache access pattern from the
beginning of the HMAC verification. In the case of invalid padding,
the code typically assumes zero-length padding, and the HMAC
verification will access all of the TLS record bytes (possibly exclud-
ing the last byte). However, if the padding is valid and long (e.g.
PadLen = 255, in which case there are 256 bytes of padding), the
HMAC verification will not access the last PadLen + 1 bytes of the
TLS record.
6.2 synchronized prime PRIME+PROBE Attack
Description
Our synchronized prime PRIME+PROBE attack exploits this differ-
ence in the access pattern using a PRIME+PROBE [30] cache attack.
We synchronize the PRIME part of the attack to run in parallel to
the HMAC verification process, that is, after the padding check but
before the HMAC verification is done. The maximum TLS record
size is ca. 214 bytes, corresponding to about 28 compression func-
tion calls for a 64-byte hash block size. By working with ciphertexts
of this size, we can force the HMAC verification to take a long time
to complete. This makes the synchronization of the attack relatively
easy.
The attack (described in Algorithm 5) has four main parts:
(1) Finding the cache sets containing the last bytes of the TLS
record.
(2) Sending the attack TLS record. The TLS record is constructed
to have long valid padding, except possibly in the first padding
byte. This is the byte we try to recover in the attack.
(3) Delaying till the HMAC verification begins. This occurs af-
ter the decryption and padding check is finished (and takes a
constant amount of time regardless of the padding).
(4) In parallel to the HMAC verification, we Prime the end of the
TLS record to evict it from the cache.
(5) After the end of the HMAC verification calculation, we probe
the cache set that contains the last few bytes of the TLS record.
If it was accessed, then with high probability the padding was
invalid; otherwise it was valid.
6.3 Constructing an Attack on TLS Records
It remains to explain how we construct the TLS records used in the
attack, and how we use the results of the oracle to recover plaintext
bytes (HTTP cookie bytes in this case). We rely on techniques first
9
explained in [14]: we use HTTP pathname padding and the ability to
choose plaintext bytes that are placed after the cookie in the HTTP
request to ensure that the plaintext in the TLS record contains 16
consecutive blocks in which the first block has the form:
p∗ | |“\r”| |“\n”| |0xFF| | . . . | |0xFF,
and the remaining 15 blocks consist solely of values 0xFF. Here p∗
is the last byte of the cookie and the target of the first step of the at-
tack, while “\r′′, “\n′′ represent ASCII characters inserted after the
cookie by HTTP. Note that these plaintext blocks are almost correct
padding of maximum length; of course they are incorporated into a
TLS record containing an HMAC tag and correct TLS padding. Let
C∗0 , . . . ,C
∗
15 denote the matching ciphertext blocks in the resulting
TLS record, and let C∗−1 denote the preceding ciphertext block.
The attack TLS record is then constructed as:
HDR| |L| |C∗−1 ⊕ ∆| |C∗0 | | . . . | |C∗15
where HDR is a suitable header, L is a long random block sequence
that brings the TLS record up to the maximum size, and ∆ is a mask
with bytes:
δ | |(“\r” ⊕ 0xFF)| |(“\n” ⊕ 0xFF)| |0x00| | . . . | |0x00.
Here, the first mask byte creates a value p∗ ⊕ δ in the first position
of the block decrypting C∗0 , while the second and third mask bytes
force values 0xFF in the corresponding positions. Clearly, when
decrypted, this TLS record will have correct padding of length 256
if and only if p∗ ⊕ δ = 0xFF. The attacker then uses TLS records
of this form with distinct values of δ in the attack of Algorithm 5;
after 128 attempts on average and 256 in the worst case, the value
of δ producing correct padding will be identified.
This description explains how to recover the last byte of the
cookie. Further bytes can be recovered by shifting the position of
the cookie by altering the length of the pathname in the HTTP
request so that the last 2, 3, . . . bytes are present at the start of the
block underlying C∗0 . We also update ∆ as needed to force correct
padding 0xFF in all but the first byte of this block. This approachwill
recover up to 14 bytes of the cookie; the remaining bytes seems to
remain inaccessible using these techniques (trying to extend further
would push the “\r” and “\n” characters into the next block, where
they could not be turned into correct padding by XOR masking).
We close this description by noting that the above attack with
long padding patterns can be applied to the original Lucky 13 set-
ting, quadrupling the timing differences there and so making them
substantially easier to detect (at the cost of limiting how much
plaintext can be recovered). This enhancement to Lucky 13 seems
to have been missed by the authors of [3], though they used a
similar idea in their distinguishing attack.
6.4 Proof of Concept for synchronized prime
PRIME+PROBE attack
We implemented a PoC for the above attack for wolfSSL, to verify
the presence of the cache side-channel. We ran our attack on an
Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-7500U CPU @ 2.70GHz running Ubuntu 17.10.
We used the version 3.14 code taken from the master branch of the
official git repository on 20/4/2018 (commit hash 7d425a5c), and
compiled with the provided make files and GCC version 7.2.0.
6.4.1 wolfSSL code. The TLS record verification is done in func-
tion TimingPadVerify (see Listing 5 in Appendix A). First, the
padding is checked by the function PadCheck. If the padding check
fails, the branch taken by the code implicitly assumes PadLen = 0
and HMAC is calculated over the whole TLS record excluding the
last byte (that is assumed to be the minimal length padding). How-
ever, if the padding is valid, HMAC is calculated on the TLS record
excluding all of the padding bytes. To achieve constant time, the
extra compression function CompressRounds is called. However,
this is done with the dummy array, which points to the start of the
ssl context. So in case of valid padding the last bytes of the TLS
record are not accessed.
6.4.2 Attack results. We prepared two types of decrypted TLS
records. The first one with 256 bytes of valid padding and the sec-
ond one being identical, except for the first byte of padding which
was changed to a different value. We called the TimingPadVerify
function multiple times with both types of data. Before each call to
the function, another “attack” thread was run in parallel to perform
the cache priming during the HMAC verification. After the function
returned, we checked if the cache line of the last bytes in the TLS
record is in the cache or not. For TLS records with valid padding
we saw a hit probability of ≈ 0.025. For TLS records with invalid
padding we saw a hit probability of ≈ 0.998. Using the same calcu-
lations as in Section 5.3.3 this translates to n = 4 and an expected
total number of TLS connections of 512 per byte.
6.4.3 mbed TLS. The same vulnerability also applies to the
mbed TLS code in function ssl_decrypt_buf (see Listing 8 in
Appendix A). If the padding is invalid the function sets the variable
padlen to 0. For constant time, the extra compression function
mbedtls_md_process is called multiple times with pointer in_msg
pointing to the start of the TLS record.
6.4.4 GnuTLS. The same vulnerability also applies to theGnuTLS
code in function decrypt_packet (see Listing 4 in Appendix A).
If the padding is invalid the function sets pad to 0. For constant
time, extra compression functions are executed via dummy_wait
(see Listing 3 in Appendix A). If the padding was invalid, the func-
tion does nothing and returns. If the padding was valid, but the
HMAC verification fails, the extra compression function _gnutls_
auth_cipher_add_auth is called multiple times with the pointer
data, pointing to the start of the TLS record.
Note that unlike other implementations, the extra compression
functions are only called when the verification process fails, so
the decryption time on valid messages is not constant. This may
leak the real size of the encrypted messages, but cannot be used to
recover plaintext bytes.
7 A CACHE-BASED PADDING ORACLE IN
THE MBED TLS IMPLEMENTATION
We will describe another novel attack on mbed TLS targeting the
inner hash function execution in HMAC. This attack is more robust
than the one described in Section 6 as it does not require the syn-
chronization between the attack and target code. At first we will
describe a simplified version that assumes a small cache line size.
The full “PostFetch” attack will show how we can deal with mod-
ern cache line sizes and memory prefetching. Our attack works on
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HMAC with both SHA-384 and SHA-256, even if the bug described
in Section 3.2is fixed.
7.1 Attack Preliminaries
HMAC makes two hashing passes over its input message, which
we refer to as the inner and outer hashes. The inner hash processes
a string of the form K1 | |M to produce a hash value h; the outer
hash processes an input K2 | |h. Here K1,K2 are keys derived from a
single key by XOR offsets and M is the message input. The hash
functions used in HMAC in TLS are based on the Merkle-Damgård
construction [28]. This construction pads the message being pro-
cessed to a multiple of the hash function’s block size. The usual
hash function padding scheme is to always add the byte 0x80 and
then zero bytes up to the required length.8
In mbed TLS the hash padding is implemented by defining a con-
stant array containing the maximum possible length hash padding
pattern, and passing this array with the required padding length to
the hash update function (see Listing 7 in Appendix A; SHA-384
is simply a truncated output of SHA512). Our cache attack targets
the access pattern to this constant array to create a padding oracle.
A maximum hash padding length will cause the entire array to
be saved in the cache, while a short hash padding will cause only
the beginning of the array to be saved in the cache. To check if
parts of the array are in the cache or not we can use cache attacks
that exploit shared memory pages. If the attack code runs on the
same core as the target code we can use a simple PRIME+PROBE
attack on the L1 cache [30]. However, if the code runs on different
cores (as is the case in most cross-VM attacks) we can use more
advanced cross-core attacks [16, 21, 23]. For brevity and without
loss of generality we will use the PRIME+PROBE notation.
7.2 Hash Padding Length for SHA-384
For the inner hash calculation of HMAC-SHA-384, the length of the
hash padding for an encrypted message with length EncMsgLen is
calculated in the following way:
HashLen = InnerHashKeyLen + SeqNumLen + HdrLen
+ EncMsgLen −MacLen − IVLen − PadLen − 1
= 128 + 8 + 5 + EncMsgLen − 48 − 16 − PadLen − 1
= EncMsgLen + 76 − PadLen, hence:
HashPadLen = 112 − HashLen mod 128
= 36 − EncMsgLen + PadLen mod 128 (1)
Note that if HashPadLen = 0 mod 128 then HashPadLen = 128.
The length of the hash padding for the outer hash calculation in
HMAC-SHA-384 is calculated via:
HashLen = OuterHashKeyLen + HashLen = 128 + 48 = 176
HashPadLen = 112 − HashLen mod 128 = 64
So the the number of hash padding bytes accessed in the HMAC
calculation is given by:
HashPadLen = max(36 − EncMsgLen + PadLen mod 128, 64)
8This hash padding is distinct from the padding added by TLS in CBC-mode and which
is actually transmitted as part of TLS records.
Algorithm 6 mbed TLS – Simplified Attack
1: function SimplifiedMbedPadOracle(attack_msд)
2: ProbeOffset← 64 ▷ 32 for SHA-256
3: Prime shaX_paddinд + ProbeOffset ▷ evict from cache
4: Send attacker’s TLS record to target
5: if Probe(shaX_paddinд + ProbeOffset) then
6: return 1 ▷ last part of the array was accessed
7: else
8: return 0 ▷ last part of the array was not accessed
9: end if
10: end function
7.3 Hash Padding Length for SHA-256
For the inner hash calculation of HMAC based on SHA-256, the
length of the hash padding for an encrypted message with length
EncMsдLen is calculated in the following way:
HashLen = InnerHashKeyLen + SeqNumLen + HdrLen
+ EncMsgLen −MacLen − IVLen − PadLen − 1
= 64 + 8 + 5 + EncMsgLen − 32 − 16 − PadLen − 1
= EncMsgLen + 28 − PadLen, hence:
HashPadLen = 56 − HashLen mod 64
= 28 − EncMsgLen + PadLen mod 64 (2)
Note that if HashPadLen = 0 mod 64 then HashPadLen = 64.
For the outer hash calculation of HMAC-SHA-256, we have:
HashLen = OuterHashKeyLen + HashLen = 64 + 32 = 96
HashPadLen = 56 − HashLen mod 64 = 24
So the number of hash padding bytes accessed in the HMAC calcu-
lation is given by:
HashPadLen = max(28 − EncMsgLen + PadLen mod 64, 24)
7.4 Simplified Attack
The simplified attack on mbed TLS is described in Algorithm 6.
The start of the pad array is always accessed by the outer hash
calculation of HMAC. We prime a cache set that contains the array
at an offset, targeting the first cache line that is not always accessed
(offset of 64 for SHA-384 and 32 for SHA-256).We send the attacker’s
TLS record to the target, and then probe the cache set. If the cache
set was accessed, then with high probability HashPadLen > 64 (32
for SHA-256). Otherwise we know that HashPadLen ≤ 63 (31 for
SHA-256). From this we can infer a possible range for the value of
PadLen. Using the attack described in Section 6.3 we can create a
padding oracle to distinguish between invalid padding of length
PadLen = 0, and a large padding value.
For this simplified attack to work, we need the following assump-
tions to hold:
(1) The cache line size is 32.
(2) The padding array is aligned with the cache line.
(3) There are no prefetching optimizations used.
Clearly these assumptions are unrealistic, and we show next how
they can be relaxed.
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7.5 Full “PostFetch” Attack
The full “PostFetch” attack is the same as the one described in
Algorithm 6, but the way that we choose the values of ProbeOffset
and the resulting condition on HashPadLen are different. This is
due to the following real world conditions:
(1) In most modern CPUs, the cache line size is 64 bytes. This
makes the simplified attack on SHA-256 impractical.
(2) The padding array is not always aligned with a 64-byte cache
line. As the alignment keyword is not used in the array declara-
tion, it can vary from compilation to compilation. On our test
platform, the padding arrays were either aligned to a cache line,
or had a 32-byte offset. The alignment was changed between
compilations by minor code changes (e.g. adding or removing
a printf function call).
(3) In the hash implementation, the padding array is always copied
to the hash function’s internal buffer using the memcpy function.
Due to the cache line size the array is read into the cache in
cache line resolution even if just a single byte in the cache line
has been accessed. On our test platform, we observed that the
bytes after the array are also read into to cache (the next cache
line), if we read a large enough part of the array (near the end
of the cache line). For example, if the SHA-384 padding array
is aligned to the cache line, the outer hash call of HMAC (that
uses a hash padding of length 64) will cause a cache hit on
the next cache line, so the entire 128 bytes padding array will
be in the cache regardless of the TLS record padding length.
This causes the simplified attack on SHA-384 to also become
impractical.
Although each of the above conditions can cause our attack
to fail, the combination of these conditions actually allows the
attacks to work! Instead of probing the cache line at an offset
ProbeOffset = 64 (32 for SHA-256), we probe the next cache line us-
ing ProbeOffset = 128 (64 for SHA-256). In fact we probe a memory
location that is just after the padding array itself. In some cases this
memory location will be read into the cache due to either hardware
memory prefetching mechanism or speculative execution. For our
attack to work we require that the probed memory location is not
accessed by any other code in the verification process. As we will
show, this is indeed the case in mbed TLS (see Section 7.7).
In case the hash padding array is aligned to the cache line, the
last cache line for the array will be always accessed due to the
memcpy call in the outer hash of HMAC. However the cache line
after that will not be accessed, unless we read most of the bytes
of the padding array (a very large value of HashPadLen). In case
the array has a 32-byte offset to the cache line, the cache line at
location ProbeOffset = 128 (64 for SHA-256), includes both the end
of the array and some data that is stored afterwards. This cache
line will only be accessed if HashPadLen is large.
7.6 Proof of Concept
We implemented a PoC for the above attack, to verify the pres-
ence of the cache side-channel. We ran our attack on an Intel(R)
Core(TM) i7-7500U CPU @ 2.70GHz running Ubuntu 17.10. We use
the version 2.7 code taken from thembedtls-2.7 branch of the official
git repository on 4/4/2018 (commit hash be97c9cc), and compiled
with the provided makefiles and GCC version 7.2.0. We targeted the
Hash Array offset Hash Padding Cache Hit
function from cache line length range probability
SHA-384 32 1 − 72 ≈ 0.026
SHA-384 32 73 − 128 ≈ 0.998
SHA-256 32 1 − 32 ≈ 0.002
SHA-256 32 32 − 64 ≈ 0.998
SHA-384 0 1 − 104 ≈ 0.028
SHA-384 0 105 − 128 ≈ 0.999
SHA-256 0 1 − 64 ≈ 0.999
Table 3: Cache hit probabilities for mbed TLS attack
HMAC function call sequence that is used in the ssl_decrypt_buf
function (see Listing 8 in Appendix A). This HMAC code is the
latest pseudo constant time version, designed to protect against
previous timing and cache attacks.
We ran the code multiple times with different lengths for the
decrypted TLS record. We primed the memory before the HMAC
execution, and probed it afterwards. We attacked both the SHA-384
and SHA-256 implementations, with the hash padding array both
aligned and not aligned (i.e. with a 32-byte offset) relative to the
cache line. The experimentally obtained cache hit probabilities
are given in Table 3. Because of the differing probabilities, we
obtain reliable hash padding length oracles for three out of the
four combinations, the exception being when SHA-256 is combined
with a cache-aligned padding array.
7.7 Analysis of the Proof of Concept
As we described in Section 7.5, our full cache attack targets a cache
line that contains the data stored just after the hash padding array.
For this attack to work, the data after the array must not be accessed
by the targeted code (otherwise we will always get a cache hit).
When analyzing the PoC results we can see that this requirement
is indeed fulfilled, except for the case of SHA-256 with a cache-
aligned array. By analyzing the compiled program in this case, we
discovered that the data the compiler stores just after the array is
an array of round constants used in the SHA-256/SHA-384 compres-
sion function. This function is called in the finalization of the hash
calculation just after accessing the hash padding array. In theory,
our attack shouldn’t work on this specific build of the code.
To get a better understanding we looked at a dump of the com-
piled assembly code of the compression function, taken from the
mbed TLS server example program ssl_server2 (see Listing 9 in
Appendix A). In both the SHA-384 and SHA-256 code, the program-
mer unrolled the first 8 rounds of the compression function. To
optimise performance, the GCC compiler uses hard-coded assembly
movabs commands to push the first 8 round constants into registers.
For the remaining rounds, the code uses the constants stored in
the array. So although the first 8 round constants are stored in the
array, they are never accessed. Since SHA-384 constants are 64 bits
each, storing the first 8 round constants requires 64 bytes. So the 64
bytes after the hash padding array are never accessed. This means
that, regardless of the array alignment, the cache line we target is
only accessed due to the hash padding array and the attack can
work. However, in the SHA-256 case, the round constants are only
32 bits long. So storing the first 8 constants requires just 32 bytes.
The attack then works when the hash padding array has a 32-byte
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offset to the cache line. In this case, the targeted cache line holds
the end of the hash padding array, and the first 8 round constants;
then the cache line is only accessed due to the hash padding array
and our attack succeeds. In the other case, the hash padding array
is aligned with the cache line and the targeted cache line holds
the first 16 round constants. Since the constants of round 9 to 16
are accessed by the compression function, this cache line is always
accessed and our attack fails.
7.8 Creating the Padding Oracle
Combining the results from Table 3 and equations 1 and 2, we obtain
a CBC-mode padding oracle in the mbed TLS implementation of the
form PadLen > 4 + 16k mod 128 for any k (mod64 for SHA-256).
We use this padding oracle with the attack described in Section 6.3
to get a much more robust attack. Using the same calculations as
in Section 5.3.3 we get an expected total number of cache attack
executions (and TLS connections) of 384 per byte for SHA-256.
8 CONCLUSION
We have conducted an in-depth analysis of the security of pseudo
constant time countermeasures to the Lucky 13 attack on CBC-
mode in TLS. We examined a representative set of implementations,
and found them all to be vulnerable to cache timing attacks. We
developed three new techniques for exploiting leakage from cache
timing and access patterns, and a novel variant of Lucky 13 with
increased timing differences. These ideas may be applicable in at-
tacking other cryptographic schemes. We produced PoCs for most
of the attacks and evaluated the number of iterations of the basic
cache timing step (and consequently the number of TLS connec-
tions) needed for the attacks to succeed. The requirements of the
attacks are modest, especially in view of our novel greedy algorithm
for selecting which mask value to use at each stage.
The main takeaway from our work is encapsulated in the title
of our paper: pseudo constant time protections only give "pseudo
security". CBC-mode in TLS seems destined to stay with us for some
years to come, despite the growth in usage of AES-GCM and the
impending arrival of TLS 1.3, due to the need to support legacy code
and devices. The “Encrypt-then-MAC” countermeasure from RFC
7366 is supported in mbed TLS and GnuTLS, but requires client-side
support and has seen little uptake elsewhere (e.g. neither Firefox
nor Chrome supports the EtM extension). We suggest that all the
pseudo constant time implementations should seriously consider
adopting a fully constant time, constant memory access approach to
defending against Lucky 13 and its variants – only this can provide
robust security across a broad range of deployment (and thereby
attack) scenarios.
The paper opens up several avenues for future work. Our greedy
algorithm for selecting masks has good performance (coming close
to the information theoretic lower bound in some cases), but it
would be of interest to seek optimal algorithms. These may be of
independent interest in other areas of cryptanalysis. We use only
a single oracle condition, whereas we can often obtain multiple
conditions by carefully varying the length of ciphertexts. It may be
possible to exploit the availability of multiple conditions to further
reduce the number of TLS connections needed. Our results with a
single condition in combination with our greedy algorithm already
illustrate the dangers of settling for pseudo constant time code. Fi-
nally, when considering the recovery of multiple plaintext bytes, we
used a simple byte-by-byte analysis to estimate plaintext recovery
rates. A more sophisticated approach would be to design attacks
that produce likelihood values for each plaintext byte candidate,
and then combine these across multiple bytes using enumeration
techniques from the side-channel literature [7, 11, 25, 26, 34].
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A SOURCE CODE
Listing 1: s2n HMAC digest for CBC verify
int s2n_hmac_ d i g e s t _two_compress ion_rounds ( s t ruc t s2n_hmac_ s t a t e ∗ s t a t e ,
void ∗ out , u i n t 3 2 _ t s i z e ) {
/ ∗ Do t h e " r e a l " work o f t h i s f u n c t i o n . ∗ /
GUARD( s2n_hmac_ d i g e s t ( s t a t e , out , s i z e ) ) ;
/ ∗ I f t h e r e were 9 o r more b y t e s o f s p a c e l e f t i n t h e c u r r e n t hash b l o c k
∗ t h en t h e s e r i a l i z e d l e n g t h , p l u s an 0 x80 by te , w i l l have f i t i n t h a t b l o c k .
∗ I f t h e r e were f ewe r than 9 th en add ing t h e l e n g t h w i l l have c au s e d an e x t r a
∗ c omp r e s s i o n b l o c k round . Th i s d i g e s t f u n c t i o n a lways d o e s two c omp r e s s i o n rounds ,
∗ even i f t h e r e i s no need f o r t h e s e c o nd .
∗ /
i f ( s t a t e −> c u r r e n t l y _ in_hash_b l o ck > ( s t a t e −>hash_b l o ck_ s i z e − 9 ) )
return 0 ;
/ ∗ Can ' t r e u s e a hash a f t e r i t has been f i n a l i z e d ,
s o r e s e t and push an o t h e r b l o c k i n ∗ /
GUARD( s2n_hash_ r e s e t (& s t a t e −> inne r ) ) ;
/ ∗ No−op s2n_hash_upda t e t o n o rma l i z e t im ing and guard a g a i n s t Lucky13 . Th i s
d o e s no t a f f e c t t h e v a l u e o f ∗ ou t . ∗ /
return s2n_hash_update (& s t a t e −>inner , s t a t e −>xor_pad , s t a t e −>hash_b l o ck_ s i z e ) ;
}
Listing 2: s2n CBC verification function
int s2n_ v e r i f y _cbc ( s t ruc t s2n_connec t i on ∗ conn , s t ruc t s2n_hmac_ s t a t e ∗hmac ,
s t ruc t s2n_b lob ∗ dec ryp t ed ) {
/ ∗ S e t up MAC copy work spa c e ∗ /
s t ruc t s2n_hmac_ s t a t e ∗ copy = &conn−> c l i e n t −> r e co rd_mac_copy_workspace ;
. . .
/ ∗ Update t h e MAC ∗ /
GUARD( s2n_hmac_update ( hmac , dec ryp ted −>data , pay load_ l eng t h ) ) ;
GUARD( s2n_hmac_copy ( copy , hmac ) ) ;
/ ∗ Check t h e MAC ∗ /
u i n t 8 _ t check_ d i g e s t [ S2N_MAX_DIGEST_LEN ] ;
l t e _check ( mac_ d i g e s t _ s i z e , s i z eo f ( check_ d i g e s t ) ) ;
GUARD( s2n_hmac_ d i g e s t _two_compress ion_rounds ( hmac , check_d i g e s t , mac_ d i g e s t _ s i z e ) ) ;
Listing 3: GnuTLS’s extra compression call calculation
s t a t i c void dummy_wai t ( r e c o rd_pa rame te r s_ s t ∗ params , g nu t l s _datum_ t ∗ p l a i n t e x t ,
unsigned pad_ f a i l e d , unsigned int pad , unsigned t o t a l ) {
. . .
/ ∗ Th i s i s r e a l l y s p e c i f i c t o t h e c u r r e n t hash f u n c t i o n s .
∗ I t s h o u l d be removed onc e a p r o t o c o l f i x i s i n p l a c e .
∗ /
i f ( ( pad + t o t a l ) % l en > l en − 9 && t o t a l % l en <= l en − 9 ) {
i f ( l e n < p l a i n t e x t −> s i z e ) _
g nu t l s _auth_ c i p h e r _add_auth (&params−>read . c i p h e r _ s t a t e ,
p l a i n t e x t −>data , l e n ) ;
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Listing 4: GnuTLS’s pad check and HMAC verification
de c ryp t _packe t ( g nu t l s _ s e s s i o n _ t s e s s i on , g nu t l s _datum_ t ∗ c i p h e r t e x t ,
g n u t l s _datum_ t ∗ p l a i n , c on t en t _ type_ t type , r e c o rd_pa rame te r s_ s t ∗ params ,
g nu t l s _ u i n t 6 4 ∗ sequence ) {
. . .
pad = p l a i n −>data [ c i p h e r t e x t −> s i z e − 1 ] ; / ∗ pad ∗ /
. . .
for ( i = 2 ; i <= MIN ( 2 5 6 , c i p h e r t e x t −> s i z e ) ; i ++) {
tmp_pad_ f a i l e d | = ( p l a i n −>data [ c i p h e r t e x t −> s i z e − i ] != pad ) ;
pad_ f a i l e d | = ( ( i <= ( 1 + pad ) ) & ( tmp_pad_ f a i l e d ) ) ;
}
i f ( u n l i k e l y ( pad_ f a i l e d != 0 | | ( 1 + pad > ( ( in t ) c i p h e r t e x t −> s i z e − t ag_ s i z e ) ) ) ) {
/ ∗ We do no t f a i l h e r e . We ch e c k be l ow f o r t h e
∗ t h e pad_ f a i l e d . I f z e r o means s u c c e s s .
∗ /
pad_ f a i l e d = 1 ;
pad = 0 ;
}
length = c i p h e r t e x t −> s i z e − t ag_ s i z e − pad − 1 ;
. . .
r e t = _ gnu t l s _auth_ c i p h e r _add_auth (&params−>read . c t x . t l s 1 2 , p l a i n −>data , length ) ;
i f ( u n l i k e l y ( g nu t l s _memcmp( tag , t ag_pt r , t ag_ s i z e ) != 0 | | pad_ f a i l e d != 0 ) ) {
/ ∗ HMAC was no t t h e same . ∗ /
dummy_wai t ( params , p l a i n , pad_ f a i l e d , pad , length + preamble_ s i z e ) ;
Listing 5: WolfSSL’s extra compression call calculation
COMPRESS_UPPER = 55 , / ∗ c omp r e s s i o n c a l c numera to r ∗ /
COMPRESS_LOWER = 64 , / ∗ c omp r e s s i o n c a l c d enomina t o r ∗ /
/ ∗ g e t c omp r e s s i o n e x t r a r ound s ∗ /
s t a t i c INLINE in t GetRounds ( in t pLen , in t padLen , in t t ) {
. . .
L1 −= COMPRESS_UPPER ;
L2 −= COMPRESS_UPPER ;
i f ( ( L1 % COMPRESS_LOWER) == 0 )
roundL1 = 0 ;
i f ( ( L2 % COMPRESS_LOWER) == 0 )
roundL2 = 0 ;
Listing 6: WolfSSL’s pad checke and HMAC verification
/ ∗ t im ing r e s i s t a n t pad / v e r i f y check , r e t u r n 0 on s u c c e s s ∗ /
s t a t i c int TimingPadVer i fy (WOLFSSL ∗ s s l , const by te ∗ input , in t padLen , in t t ,
in t pLen , in t con t en t ) {
by te v e r i f y [WC_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE ] ;
by te dmy[ s i z eo f (WOLFSSL ) >= MAX_PAD_SIZE ? 1 : MAX_PAD_SIZE ] = { 0 } ;
by t e ∗ dummy = s i z eo f ( dmy ) < MAX_PAD_SIZE ? ( by te ∗ ) s s l : dmy ;
. . .
i f ( PadCheck ( i npu t + pLen − ( padLen + 1 ) , ( by t e ) padLen , padLen + 1 ) != 0 ) {
WOLFSSL_MSG( " PadCheck ␣ f a i l e d " ) ;
PadCheck (dummy , ( by te ) padLen , MAX_PAD_SIZE − padLen − 1 ) ;
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s s l −>hmac ( s s l , v e r i f y , input , pLen − t , con ten t , 1 ) ; / ∗ s t i l l compare ∗ /
ConstantCompare ( v e r i f y , i npu t + pLen − t , t ) ;
. . .
PadCheck (dummy , ( by te ) padLen , MAX_PAD_SIZE − padLen − 1 ) ;
r e t = s s l −>hmac ( s s l , v e r i f y , input , pLen − padLen − 1 − t , con ten t , 1 ) ;
CompressRounds ( s s l , GetRounds ( pLen , padLen , t ) , dummy ) ;
. . .
}
Listing 7: MBedTLS’s SHA512 finish function
s t a t i c const unsigned char sha512_padding [ 1 2 8 ] = {
0 x80 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ,
. . .
0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 } ;
in t mbedt l s_sha512_ f i n i s h _ r e t ( mbed t l s_sha512_ c on t e x t ∗ c tx ,
unsigned char ou tpu t [ 6 4 ] ) {
s i z e _ t l a s t , padn ;
. . .
l a s t = ( s i z e _ t ) ( c tx −> t o t a l [ 0 ] & 0 x7F ) ;
padn = ( l a s t < 112 ) ? ( 112 − l a s t ) : ( 240 − l a s t ) ;
i f ( ( r e t = mbed t l s_sha512_update_ r e t ( c tx , sha512_padding , padn ) ) != 0 )
return ( r e t ) ;
Listing 8: MBedTLS’s CBC HMAC verification
s t a t i c int s s l _ d e c ryp t _buf ( mbed t l s_ s s l _ c on t e x t ∗ s s l ) {
. . .
padlen = 1 + s s l −> in_msg [ s s l −> in_msglen − 1 ] ;
. . .
for ( i = 1 ; i <= 2 5 6 ; i ++ ) {
r e a l _count &= ( i <= padlen ) ;
pad_count += r e a l _count ∗ ( s s l −> in_msg [ padding_ i dx + i ] == padlen − 1 ) ;
}
c o r r e c t &= ( pad_count == padlen ) ; / ∗ Only 1 on c o r r e c t padd ing ∗ /
padlen &= c o r r e c t ∗ 0 x1FF ;
. . .
∗ Known t im ing a t t a c k s :
∗ − Lucky Th i r t e en ( h t t p : / /www. i s g . r h u l . ac . uk / t l s / TLS t iming . pd f )
∗
∗ We use ( ( Lx + 8 ) / 64 ) to hand le ' neg a t i v e ␣ Lx ' v a l u e s
∗ c o r r e c t l y . (We round down i n s t e a d o f up , so −56 i s the c o r r e c t
∗ va lue for our c a l c u l a t i o n s i n s t e a d o f −55)
∗ /
s i z e _ t j , e x t r a _run = 0 ;
e x t r a _run = ( 13 + s s l −> in_msglen + padlen + 8 ) / 64 −
( 13 + s s l −> in_msglen + 8 ) / 6 4 ;
. . .
mbed t l s_md_hmac_update ( &s s l −> t r an s f o rm_in −>md_c t x _dec , s s l −> in_c t r , 8 ) ;
mbed t l s_md_hmac_update ( &s s l −> t r an s f o rm_in −>md_c t x _dec , s s l −> in_hdr , 3 ) ;
mbed t l s_md_hmac_update ( &s s l −> t r an s f o rm_in −>md_c t x _dec , s s l −> in_len , 2 ) ;
mbed t l s_md_hmac_update ( &s s l −> t r an s f o rm_in −>md_c t x _dec , s s l −> in_msg ,
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s s l −> in_msglen ) ;
mbed t l s_md_hmac_ f i n i s h ( &s s l −> t r an s f o rm_in −>md_c t x _dec , mac_expe c t ) ;
/ ∗ Ca l l mb ed t l s_md_ p r o c e s s a t l e a s t on c e due t o c a ch e a t t a c k s ∗ /
for ( j = 0 ; j < e x t r a _run + 1 ; j ++ )
mbed t l s_md_p r o c e s s ( &s s l −> t r an s f o rm_in −>md_c t x _dec , s s l −> in_msg ) ;
mbed t l s_md_hmac_ r e s e t ( &s s l −> t r an s f o rm_in −>md_c t x _dec ) ;
Listing 9: MBedTLS’s internal SHA512 process function assmebly code
48690 <mbed t l s_ i n t e r n a l _sha512_proce s s > :
. . .
4 8 7 9 7 : 49 b f 18 81 6d da d5 movabs $0xab1c5ed5da6d8118 ,% r15
4879 e : 5 e 1 c ab
487 a1 : 48 bd 2 f 3b 4d ec c f movabs $ 0 xb 5 c 0 f b c f e c 4 d 3b 2 f ,% rbp
487 a8 : f b c0 b5
487 ab : 4 c 89 7 c 24 20 mov %r15 , 0 x20 (% r sp )
487 b0 : 49 b f 9b 4 f 19 a f a4 movabs $ 0 x 9 2 3 f 8 2 a 4 a f 1 9 4 f 9 b ,% r15
487 b7 : 82 3 f 92
487 ba : 49 bd cd 65 e f 23 91 movabs $0x7137449123e f 65cd ,% r13
487 c1 : 44 37 71
487 c4 : 4 c 89 7 c 24 18 mov %r15 , 0 x18 (% r sp )
487 c9 : 49 b f 19 d0 05 b6 f 1 movabs $0x59 f 111 f 1b605d019 ,% r15
487 d0 : 11 f 1 59
487 d3 : 49 bc 22 ae 28 d7 98 movabs $0x428a2 f 98d728ae22 ,% r12
487 da : 2 f 8 a 42
. . .
4 8 8 0 2 : 49 b f 38 b5 48 f 3 5b movabs $0x3956c25b f348b538 ,% r15
4 8 8 0 9 : c2 56 39
4880 c : 48 89 74 24 30 mov %r s i , 0 x30 (% r sp )
4 8 8 1 1 : 4 c 89 7 c 24 08 mov %r15 , 0 x8 (% r sp )
4 8 8 1 6 : 49 b f bc db 89 81 a5 movabs $0xe9b5dba58189dbbc ,% r15
4881 d : db b5 e9
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